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Abstract
This paper elaborates some of the conceptual implications of Derrida’s call for “another 
thinking of life” in Voyous: Deux essais sur la raison. The paper first argues that Derrida’s 
deconstruction of the opposition between metaphorical and literal uses of the discourse of 
life in La vie la mort is radicalized in Voyous when he argues that democracy’s “autoimmun-
itary suicide” should be the point of departure for rethinking life in general. To understand 
further these autoimmune-suicidal tendencies, the paper turns to Derrida’s engagement 
with Aristotle’s conceptual figure of the prime mover in Voyous. The paper argues that 
Derrida turns to Aristotle because the prime mover illustrates the ways in which the con-
cept of life remains historically and structurally informed by the philosophical value of 
ipseitocratic sovereignty, which is allergic to the disseminatory, proliferating, and improper 
qualities that the philosophical tradition has always ascribed to democracy. Autoimmunity 
thus provides a way for thinking of a democratic life that is not entirely determined by the 
teleological power of any divinely good life. 
Keywords: Derrida; Aristotle; autoimmunity; sovereignty; democracy; onto-theology; 
prime mover; ipseity; life; death 
Resum. Una altra vida. Democràcia, suïcidi, ipseïtat, autoimmunitat 
Aquest article elabora algunes de les implicacions conceptuals de l’exigència de Derrida 
d’un «altre pensament de la vida» a Voyous: Deux essais sur la raison. L’article sosté en pri-
mer lloc que la desconstrucció de Derrida de l’oposició entre els usos metafòrics i literaris 
del discurs de la vida a La vie la mort es radicalitza a Voyous quan s’afirma que el «suïcidi 
autoimmunitari» de la democràcia hauria de ser el punt de partida per repensar la vida en 
general. Per comprendre millor aquestes tendències autoimmuno-suïcides, l’article valora 
el compromís de Derrida amb la figura conceptual del primer motor d’Aristòtil a Voyous. 
L’article sosté que Derrida torna a Aristòtil perquè el primer motor il·lustra la manera en 
què el concepte de vida roman històricament i estructuralment informat pel valor filosòfic 
de la sobirania ipseitocràtica, que és al·lèrgica a les qualitats disseminants, proliferants i 
impròpies que la tradició sempre ha atribuït a la democràcia. Així, l’autoimmunitat ofe-
reix una manera de pensar la vida democràtica que no està del tot determinada pel poder 
teleològic de cap vida divinament bona. 
Paraules clau: Derrida; Aristòtil; autoimmunitat; sobirania; democràcia; ontoteologia; 
primer motor; ipseïtat; vida; mort
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Further, if there were not other things besides perceptible ones, 
there would be no source, no order, no generation, and no heav-
enly orbits, but a source would always have a source, just as with 
all the writers on the gods and on nature. But if there are forms or 
numbers, they will be responsible for nothing, or if so, certainly 
not for motion […], and therefore there could be no everlasting 
beings. But there are. Therefore, something in the argument must 
be annulled. […] But those who say that mathematical number is 
primary, and in that way there is always another successive kind of 
thinghood, with different sources for each kind, make the thing-
hood of the sum of things arbitrarily episodic […] and make there 
be many sources; but beings do not present the aspect of being badly 
governed. “A divided sovereignty is not good; let there be one lord.”
Aristotle
Es ist für mich heute eine entscheidende Frage, wie dem techni-
schen Zeitalter überhaupt ein—und welches—politisches System 
zugeordnet werden kann. Auf diese Frage weiß ich keine Antwort. 
Ich bin nicht überzeugt, daß es die Demokratie ist.
Heidegger
0. The Deaths of Democracy or Another Concept of Life
Judging by the amount of ink that has been spilled since 2016 on the topic of 
the possible “death of democracy,” it is safe to say that fewer systemic problems 
(the notable exceptions being climate change and structural racism) have cap-
tivated more the imagination of social scientists, humanists, and public intel-
lectuals across the world in the last years than the chance that modern liberal 
democracy might finally die.1 Joining the ever-growing chorus of voices 
1. The recent bibliography on democracy’s impending death is so enormous that it would be 
impossible to provide even a highly representative summary of the literature. For key con-
tributions to this discussion that interface academic and political discussions, see Snyder 
(2017), Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), and Gessen (2020). It should be noted that the pre-
dominance of English sources in these debates about democracy’s finitude is not just a 
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sounding the alarm, British political theorist and Hobbes scholar David 
Runciman has recently added a doomsday scenario that diverges from the 
usual apocalyptic endings that are often evoked in discussions about democ-
racy’s finitude, which most often take a page from the recent history of Euro-
pean fascism as a way of imagining what the impending death of democracy 
might look like.2 According to Runciman, rather than unfolding as a full-scale 
repetition of the totalitarian regimes that spelled a certain death of democracy 
across Europe during the first three decades of the previous century, the glob-
al death of democracy that might be in store for us in the near future could 
well pass below our radars—until it is too late: 
The question for the twenty-first century is how long we can persist with 
institutional arrangements we have grown so used to trusting, that we no 
longer notice when they have ceased to work. These arrangements include 
regular elections, which remain the bedrock of democratic politics. But they 
also encompass democratic legislatures, independent law courts and a free 
press. All can continue to function as they ought while failing to deliver what 
they should. A hollowed-out version of democracy risks lulling us into a false 
sense of security. We might continue to trust in it and to look to it for rescue, 
even as we seethe with irritation at its inability to answer the call. Democracy 
could fail while remaining intact. (Runciman, 2018: 3-4)
The end of democracy that Runciman imagines looks less like the effect of 
a sudden and violent downfall than the almost natural outcome of what we 
might call, borrowing a concept from Laurent Berlant, democracy’s “slow 
death” (Berlant, 2015: 95). Although, in the passage quoted above, Runciman 
does not rely on the lexicon of life, his characterization of democracy’s demise 
seems to be informed by a physiognomic imaginary that posits something like 
a democratic body politic that has been progressively deteriorating beyond any 
possibility of repair. In fact, Runciman’s characterization of democracy’s “slow 
death” could be described even more precisely in terms of a regressive move-
ment from living organism to machine—these two understood in their tradi-
tional sense, that is, as opposites, such as we find them, for instance, in §65 
of Immanuel Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskaft (Critique of the Power of Judgment), 
where Kant distinguishes between a living being and a machine in the follow-
ing way: 
symptom of the recent political history of both the U.S. and U.K., marked by the election 
of Trump and the victory of Brexit. I see that as an effect of what I would not hesitate to 
describe as the Anglo-American global hegemony on determining what counts as a true 
democracy across the world. This Anglo-American hegemonic hold on democracy is exert-
ed not only through the geopolitical strategies of the American and British states, but also 
through the equally hegemonic hold that Anglo-American academies and academics have 
on the discussion of global matters. These hegemonies, in turn, are not divorced from the 
global dominance that English still exerts as the global lingua franca.
2. For a recent example of this argument, see Lepore (2020).
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Ein organisiertes Wesen ist also nicht bloß Maschine: denn die hat lediglich 
bewegende Kraft; sondern sie besitzt in sich bildende Kraft, und zwar eine 
solche, die sie den Materien mitteilt, welche sie nicht haben (sie organisiert): 
also eine sich fortpflanzende bildende Kraft, welche durch das Bewegungsver-
mögen allein (den Mechanism) nicht erklärt werden kann. (Kant, 1974: 322) 
An organized being is therefore not merely a machine: for a machine only 
has moving power; rather it possesses in itself a formative power, and indeed 
such that it imparts it [i.e., formative power] on matters that do not have it 
(it organizes): thus it is a self-propagating formative power, which cannot be 
explained through the capacity for movement alone (mechanism).3
Democracy’s “slow death,” per Runciman, might take the form of the 
progressive becoming-machine of democratic institutions across the globe in 
the manner outlined by Kant in the passage above. Democratic institutions 
have not ceased to “move,” and thus to “function,” and it is possible that they 
will not have ceased to function in the future (Runciman, 2018: 2); what is 
increasingly likely, however, is that they will operate as Kantian machines and 
not as living beings since they will have lost their own formative power, that 
is, their capacities to form and reform themselves, and, more crucially, to impart 
upon non-democratic matters the organizational form of democracy, thereby 
losing the power to propagate themselves by self-replication. In other words, 
the “slow death” of democracy suggests that democratic institutions no longer 
exist as forms of life in Kantian terms, that is, as organized, living, self-repro-
ducing political beings.4
Probably unbeknownst to Runciman, the last sentence in the passage that 
I quoted above in which he outlines the kind of death he fears is in store for 
democracy also resembles, in more than wording alone, the lapidary sentence 
that opens Maurice Blanchot’s L’écriture du désastre (The Writing of Disaster): 
“Le désastre ruine tout en laissant tout à l’état” (“Disaster ruins everything 
while leaving everything intact.”) (Blanchot, 1980: 7). Although a dialogue 
between these two texts seems highly improbable given their enormous dis-
crepancies, I insist on bringing Blanchot’s meditations on the motif of disaster 
to bear on Runciman’s diagnoses of the “slow death” of democracy in order to 
highlight one dimension that remains implicit in the latter, namely, the role 
that the foreclosure of futurity—and thus of temporality—plays in his analy-
ses of democracy’s progressive demise. Commenting on disaster’s temporality, 
Blanchot writes: “Nous sommes au bord du désastre sans que nous puissions 
le situer dans l’avenir: il est plutôt toujours déjà passé, et pourtant nous 
sommes au bord ou sous la menace, toutes formulations qu’impliqueraient 
l’avenir si le désastre n’était ce qui ne vient pas, ce qui a arrêté toute venue.” 
3. Texts will be cited in the original language, following by English translations after the 
bibliographical parenthetical entry. All translations into English are mine unless otherwise 
noted. 
4. For a recent essay that shows how the work of Jacques Derrida deconstructs the classic 
machine/animal opposition, see Senatore (2020).
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(“We are at the edge of disaster without being able to situate it in the to-come: 
it is rather always already past, and nevertheless we are at the edge or under 
the threat, all formulations which would imply the to-come if disaster was not 
that which does not come, that which stops all coming.”) (Blanchot, 1980: 7, 
emphases mine). What makes disaster disastrous for Blanchot is not its 
destructive power. Rather than being a principle of ontic decay, disaster for 
Blanchot ruins ontology by targeting what Martin Heidegger calls the tempo-
ralization of time: disaster deprives life of meaningful ex-istence, corroding 
the form of Dasein by disrupting its proper temporal unfolding—which, for 
Heidegger, necessitates the postulation of “die Zukunft” (“the future” or, more 
literally, the “to-come”) as the temporal ecstasy and horizon from out of which 
Dasein can become itself by appropriating its own time, by temporalizing itself 
in such a way that it “in seinem eigensten Seinkönnen auf sich zukommt.” 
(“comes to its most proper possibility-to-be”) (Heidegger, 1977: 430-431). 
Reading Runciman through Blanchot’s tacit engagement with Heidegger, we 
might describe democracy’s progressive descent into mechanized “slow death” 
in terms of disaster, rather than death, understood both biologically, i.e., as 
the cessation of life, and phenomenologically, i.e., as the ontological end of 
Dasein that grounds its existential constitution as a finite, mortal being. Blan-
chot’s disaster thus provides a better category than death to account for the 
way in which, according to Runciman, democratic institutions and norms 
across the globe appear to remain “intact,” in spite of the fact that they are 
losing any vital force and therefore any life and any death worthy of the name. 
In other words, the disaster that is befalling democracies across the world is 
not so much condemning democracies to death, as it is depriving democracies 
of the possibility of both life and death, understood not simply in biological 
terms, but also in the phenomenological terms whose deactivation Blanchot’s 
disaster names and enacts. In stopping all coming, in interrupting the very 
opening of temporality that is the hallmark of proper existence and thus of a 
proper life, disaster would be preventing democracy from coming again to its 
own, thus depriving democracy of any future life, and depriving our lives of 
any democratic future. 
Now, some readers might object to the analogy that I have made in the 
previous paragraphs between Runciman’s prognoses about the disastrous 
becoming-machine of democracy and Berlant’s notion of “slow death” on the 
grounds that, for Berlant, “slow death refers to the physical wearing out of a 
population in a way that points to its deterioration as a defining condition of 
its experience and historical existence” (Berlant, 2015: 95, emphases mine). 
In other words, whereas Berlant’s concept registers how the health of real 
populations, composed of actually living human beings, has been gradually 
consumed “by the activity of reproducing life” under neoliberal regimes of 
governmentality (Berlant, 2015: 100, emphases mine), any reference to 
democracy as something that pertains to phusis or to life, as something that is 
alive or that might count as a living being, would be simply metaphorical—
more precisely, catachrestic or abusive. To this objection, I would respond with 
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a counter-hypothesis: what if this so-called metaphorical use of the lexicon of 
life—a term whose polyvalence and structural instability is such that no single 
discourse, whether biology, medicine, phenomenology, or theology, can claim 
to have determined once and for all its semantic core—pointed instead to the 
necessity of thinking life otherwise, that is, other than according to the bio-
centric (Wynter and McKittrick, 2015: 16) or metaphysical determinations 
that allow us to supposedly know that this or that use of the term life is met-
aphorical or literal, improper or proper? To put it differently: what if the 
ongoing preoccupation with the death of democracy exposed the metaphysi-
cal limits of current naturalistic, scientistic, phenomenological, and spiritual-
istic conceptions of life? If this is so, then to think about democracy as some-
thing that is alive and that might die could not be simply characterized as a 
metaphorical, and thus epistemically and ontologically suspicious transfer of 
biological terminology into political discourse. On the contrary, the fact that 
democracy is the kind of entity whose temporality and historicity can only be 
explained by relying on the lexicon of life not only intimates that democracy 
might be a living being (though perhaps not an organism); most importantly, 
it also suggests that thinking the life of democracy beyond the metaphorical 
schema that presupposes a proper conception of the life and death of the living 
might provide a way to arrive at another conception of life in general.
My goal in this paper is to elaborate these two hypotheses, namely, that the 
phrase “the life-death of democracy” is more than a simple metaphor, and that 
thinking through its non- or more-than-metaphorical status both engages and 
requires a concept of life different from traditional bio- or theo-centric con-
ceptions. I elaborate on these hypotheses by turning to several key moments 
in Jacques Derrida’s Voyous: Deux essais sur la raison (Rogues: Two Essays on 
Reason), a text that is well-suited to this task since, as Derrida himself makes 
clear from the very beginning of Voyous, the thinking of democracy’s life and 
death that he articulates throughout this text is oriented by the task of devel-
oping “l’incalculable d’une autre pensée de la vie, du vivant de la vie” (“the 
incalculable of another thinking of life, of life’s living”) (Derrida, 2003: 24). 
Indeed, my working hypothesis throughout this essay is that Derrida’s lifelong 
preoccupation with the category of life undergoes a subtle, though crucial, 
rearticulation in this late text, once Derrida begins to articulate the aporias of 
democracy’s life-death in terms of autoimmunity. Accounting for the autoim-
munity of democratic life provides the catalyst for a rethinking of life in gen-
eral, rather than the other way around. 
Accordingly, the first section of this paper turns briefly to Derrida’s recent-
ly published 1975-76 seminar, La vie la mort. In this section I focus on Der-
rida’s interrogation of the metaphoricity of life in La vie la mort as a way of 
recalibrating the pertinence of so-called biological terminology—most notably 
of the lexicon of autoimmunity—in Derrida’s interrogation of the life and 
death of democracy in Voyous. The second section then turns to the main focus 
of this paper, namely, Derrida’s reelaboration of the biological concept of 
autoimmunity in Voyous as a paradigm for thinking not only about democracy’s 
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life-death, but also about life-death in general. More specifically, I am inter-
ested in exploring further an aspect of democracy’s precarious life that Derri-
da explicitly links to its acute autoimmune status throughout Voyous, namely, 
the suicidal nature of democracy (Derrida, 2003: 57).5 That said, rather than 
continue the innovative line of inquiry opened up by Francesco Vitale and 
explore Derrida’s thinking of the aporias of democracy’s survival by unpacking 
the role that cellular suicide plays in biological discussions regarding autoim-
munity (Vitale, 2018: 175-184), this essay takes as its point of departure a 
moment in Voyous that has yet to be thoroughly explicated, namely, Derrida’s 
references to the Aristotelian conceptual figure of the prime mover (Aristotle, 
1999; 1072b).6 The main goal of this paper is to pose and sketch out a 
5. This suicidal aspect of Derrida’s thinking of democracy in relation to autoimmunity has been 
recently explored by Dimitris Vardoulakis (2018: 41). I agree with Vardoulakis’s claim that 
Derrida’s insistence on democracy’s autoimmunity as compromising the very ontological 
position of ipseity is the most crucial aspect of his thinking of the democracy-to-come with-
in the horizon of thinking life in general. That said, I don’t think Vardoulakis goes far 
enough in his exposition of the implications of this insight, partly because his thinking 
continues to operate under the assumptions that inform his earlier work on sovereignty and 
democracy, namely, that democracy is “the other of sovereignty.” (Vardoulakis, 2013: ix). 
Vardoulakis’s enduring commitment to a more simplified understanding of the aporetic 
entanglement of democracy and sovereignty, or of unconditionality and sovereignty, leads 
him to see in the most radical form of autoimmunity that threatens suicide itself or the 
sui of suicide a “chance or a promise” (Vardoulakis, 2018: 40). Again, although I agree 
with this reading, I remain skeptical of any analytics that doesn’t tarry with the ways in which 
this “chance” or “promise” is also a threat to the very possibility of a democratic life. 
6. I emphasize the words thoroughly above because some commentators have already remarked 
on the importance of this figure in Derrida’s argument in Voyous, though the questions that 
they have asked about this passage do not take up the problem that I explore in this paper. 
Although my paper expands on Sam Weber’s reading of Voyous and his argument about the 
life of the prime mover as a form of selfhood (Weber, 2008: 115), I disagree with Weber’s 
claim that “Aristotle also seems to retain the notion of an originating singularity at the very 
core of life. At the origin of life would be not just ‘life’ as such, life in general, life that can 
be lived constantly, but ‘a life,’ life in the singular, life that is finite: once and for all” 
(Weber, 2008: 115). In my opinion, Weber places too much emphasis here on Derrida’s 
remarks about both the prime mover and the first heaven’s status as finite (Derrida, 2003: 
36), without distinguishing the notion of finitude at stake in this Aristotelian context from 
the conception of finitude linked to natality/mortality as source of singularization. What 
is finite because of its perfect circularity—i.e., the first heaven of the Aristotelian kosmos—
cannot die and is therefore everlasting, and the prime mover, being the unmoved source of 
the first heaven, is even more everlasting than this spherical body. As a result, calling these 
eternal finite beings “singularities” in a Derridian sense is, at best, misleading, since Derri-
da’s thinking of singularity is, to my mind, inextricable from the aporias of mortal/natal 
in-finitude (not to mention the problem of idiomaticity and the untranslatable.) Moreover, 
Weber’s desire to retrieve Aristotle’s supposed opposition to the postulation of a general 
category of life—life as such or in general—at the origin of life seems even more misguid-
ed. This supposed singularity of the prime mover is in keeping with a standard feature of 
Aristotelian thought, which denies the productive agency or the effective causality of both 
Platonic forms and Pythagorean numbers. In the passage that I quoted as my first epigraph 
(Aristotle, 1999: 1275b 30), Aristotle himself makes that argument loud and clear: at the 
origin of the living cosmos there cannot be a Platonic form, say, life itself, since such a form 
could not cause anything to move and thus live. As Enrico Berti has argued, although 
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response to the following question: why does Derrida explicitly refer back to his 
brief engagement with Aristotle’s characterization of the prime mover as a form 
of life in Metaphysics Lambda (Aristotle, 1999; 1072b) in the context of his call 
for another concept of life that might both register the structural nature of 
democracy’s suicidability and militate in favor of democracy’s survival? In other 
words: what does the prime mover have to do with Derrida’s diagnosis of democ-
racy’s suicidal tendencies? And how would attending to the prime mover’s status 
as a living being contribute to the task of elaborating a concept of life that might 
help us to resist democracy’s suicidal tendencies in the name of la démocratie à 
venir (Derrida, 2003: 11)—to avert the disaster so that something might yet 
come to democracy, and so that there might yet be democracy to come?
The response to this question that I sketch out in the third, and final, 
section of this essay engages at once the historical and the formal sides of 
Derrida’s deconstructive reading of the history of Western political philoso-
phy, as exemplified in Voyous. As Sam Weber suggests, Derrida turns to Aris-
totle’s prime mover because, given its everlasting energeia or activity, “the life 
of the Prime Mover would […] constitute the life of the self, life as self-same” 
(Weber, 2008: 115, emphases mine). Developing Weber’s remark, this paper 
shows that the prime mover is crucial for Derrida’s genealogy of the entangle-
ment of life and sovereignty in Western ontology because it discloses the 
historical and structural solidarity between the ideas of the self or the same 
(autos/ipse) and of life (zōē/bios). In the prime mover’s ex-carnated, immateri-
al lifeform crystalizes the eidos of what Derrida calls ipséité or ipseity, which 
designates the formal-politico-ontological structure of sovereign power prior 
to the birth of any political sovereign formation, such as the state (Derrida, 
2003: 31).7 Metaphysics Lambda not only articulates a powerful (if not even 
inaugural) zoo-theo-cosmogony according to which the life of the kosmos is 
caused by the divine life of the prime mover, which, moreover, teleologically 
commands everything that lives to move and act imitatio primi moventis in 
order to attain its highest degree possible of perfection, beauty, truth, good-
Platonic forms—and even the good itself (which is beyond being)—might be pure actua-
lities for Aristotle, they are still not activities (that is, non-kinetic energeiai) and thus cannot 
be responsible for the eternal activity of cosmic motion (Berti, 2014: 618-620). Weber’s 
problematic interpretation, however, is productive insofar as it takes us straight to the core 
of the matter that, I would argue, animates Derrida’s interest in the prime mover in Voyous, 
namely, the fact that Aristotle’s conception of life in general, of the force of all living 
beings—irrespective of the supposed distinction between zōē and bios proposed most 
famously by Giorgio Agamben (Agamben, 1995: 3), but already anticipated by Martin 
Heidegger more than seven decades before (Heidegger, 2002: 74)—is teleologically and 
hierarchically determined by the position of the prime mover as a finite, yet immortal, form 
of ex-carnated, absolutely motionless life. I take the liberty of referring the reader to pre-
vious work in which I engage with Metaphysics XII by rereading the relation between the 
Prime Mover and the first heaven as an allegory of Derrida’s aporetic entanglement and 
dissociation of unconditionality and sovereignty (Mendoza-de Jesús, 2015). 
7. For an excellent take on the implications for political theory of Derrida’s thinking of ipse-
ity, see Mercier (2016).
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ness, being, and life.8 For, on Derrida’s reading, Metaphysics Lambda also 
posits ipseity as the very essence of life, installing sovereignty’s sine qua non at 
the heart of the living. We can therefore understand why Derrida insists on 
bringing up the life of the prime mover precisely at the moment in which he 
reinstates the need to rethink the concept of life in order to both acknowledge 
and resist democracy’s suicidal tendencies. For the prime mover provides a 
privileged example of the way in which the concept of life remains historical-
ly and structurally informed, from within, by the form of ipseitocratic sover-
eignty, which is allergic to the disseminatory, proliferating, and improper 
qualities that the philosophical tradition has always ascribed to democracy. 
The tacit postulation of ipseity as the telos of all life condemns democracy to 
the pursuit of a phantasmatic version of itself that amounts to its end, that is, 
to the neutralization of the chance of its coming.9 
From this preliminary foray into the problem of democracy’s suicidal ten-
dencies, its autoimmunity, and its complicated relation to ipseity, we can 
already intimate why arguments in favor of democracy’s life such as Runci-
man’s are bound to fail to even begin to address the crises of democracy that 
we are currently facing. For the liberal-democratic imaginary that fears the 
impending end of democracy is itself informed by the phantasm of a demo-
cratic ipseity, of a proper democratic life that will be more immune (if not even 
totally immune) to the diseases that currently afflict the democratic body 
politic. Against any such phantasmatic desire for a proper democracy, De rrida 
invites us to affirm democratic life as a force that is structurally divested of the 
power of self-appropriation and whose condition of survival lies precisely in 
its autoimmune resistance to its own immunity.
1. Metaphor and Reproduction: La vie la mort 
La vie la mort—Derrida’s recently published 1975-76 seminar at the École 
normale supérieure (ENS)—is concerned with the question of the so-called 
metaphorical uses of the concept and the terminology of life from its very 
opening session, where Derrida, taking stock of the fact that his seminar was 
held in tandem with the philosophy agrégation exam,10 raises the issue of the 
relationship between institutional and biological reproduction:
 8. It is worth noting that this explicitly teleological and mimetic reading of the Aristotelian 
figure of the prime mover, though warranted by the Aristotelian text, is primarily the result 
of the long historical uptake of Metaphysics Lambda, beginning with the commentaries of 
Theophrastus and Alexander through its medieval islamo-christianization in Ibn Rush and 
St. Thomas Aquinas, all the way to its modern afterlife in the philosophy of Hegel. For a 
remarkable analysis of the history of commentaries on Metaphysics Lambda, see Berti (2014: 
626-640).
 9. My way of rephrasing this structure in the context of Derrida’s work on democracy is 
deeply indebted to the powerful formalization articulated by Geoffrey Bennington, which 
crystalizes in the elegant formula: “The end is the end.” See Bennington (2016: 246-247). 
10. On the importance of the agrégation program for Derrida’s seminar, see McCance (2019: 
33-50).
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Comment expliquer que […] les métaphores biologiques ou organicistes ser-
vent si souvent à décrire l’institution, l’institution universitaire en particulier, 
aussi bien du côté de ceux qui la défendent que de ceux qui l’attaquent? […] 
Pour les uns, la nécessité du programme et de la reproduction est une con-
dition de vie, une condition de développement et de production ; pour les 
autres, le programme et la reproduction sont porteurs de mort ; et aujourd’hui, 
comme vous savez, la critique politique de l’institution, la lutte contre l’insti-
tution puise l’essentiel de son argumentation et de sa motivation dans cette 
valeur de re-production. L’université est un système visant par ses programmes, 
ses contrôles, ses contraintes, à assurer la re-production de son organisation, ce 
qui équivaut non seulement à maintenir le système des forces mais à figer le 
vivant dans la mort. Et c’est cela qu’il faudrait empêcher. Comment expliquer 
que la re-production et le programme soient à la fois des conditions de vie 
et de mort? Et cette métaphoricité est-elle fortuite ? Est-elle une structure 
métaphorique parmi d’autres? (Derrida, 2019: 26-27, emphases mine) 
How to explain that […] the biological or the organicist metaphors serve so 
often to describe the institution, the institution of the university in particular, 
just as well from the side of those who defend it as from those who attack it? 
[…] For some, the necessity of the program and of reproduction is a condition 
of life, a condition of development and production; for others, the program 
and reproduction are carriers of death; and today, as you know, the political 
critique of the institution, the struggle against the institution draws what is 
essential for its argumentation and motivation out of this value of re-produc-
tion. The university is a system aiming to assure the re-production of its orga-
nization through its programs, its controls, its constraints, which amounts not 
only to maintaining the system of forces but also to fixing the living in death. 
And that is what should be avoided. How to explain that re-production and 
the program are at once conditions of life and death? And is this metaphoricity 
fortuitous? Is it a metaphorical structure among others?
This passage is enormously rich both in its theoretical consequences and 
its historical context, so I will limit myself to point out three aspects of it that 
are crucial for my argument in what follows.
1. It should be noted, be it in passing, that Derrida’s insistence on marking 
the moment and the place in which the problem of this metaphorical co-im-
plication of biological life and institutional life is being enunciated is not 
fortuitous. Indeed, Derrida is delivering this seminar not only in the aftermath 
of 1968, but, more specifically, in an intellectual and political milieu that was 
massively preoccupied with the status of scholarly institutions as vectors of the 
reproduction of hegemonic ideologies. I will limit myself to mentioning only 
three historical indices of this moment that pertain specifically to the motif of 
reproduction or to Derrida’s career. A. The constitution of a working group 
of ex-normaliens (with the notable participation of Étienne Balibar and Pierre 
Macherey) at the ENS around the figure of Louis Althusser devoted to explor-
ing the ideological role that schools play in assuring “La reproduction des 
rapports de production” (“The Reproduction of the Relations of Production”), 
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the title of the unpublished manuscript from which Louis Althusser extracted 
his famous essay on the ideological apparatuses, published in 1970.11 This 
group also included Christian Baudelot and Roger Establet, who published 
L’École capitaliste en France in 1971. B. The publication in 1970 of Pierre 
Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron’s La reproduction. Éléments pour une théo-
rie du système d’enseignement, which proposes, among others, the thesis that 
“toute action pedagógique (AP) est objectivement une violence symbolique en 
tant qu’imposition, par un pouvoir arbitraire, d’un arbitraire culturel” (“all 
pedagogical action (PA) is objectively a symbolic violence in so far as it is the 
imposition, by an arbitrary power, of a cultural arbitrary”) (Bourdieu and Pas-
seron, 1970: 19). C. Derrida’s own activism against la loi Giscard-Haby of 
1975, which Derrida, among many, saw as an attempt to submit the entire 
French school ecosystem to “l’état actuel du marché capitaliste” (“the current 
state of the capitalist market”) and, above all, to demands of the “patronale” 
(“employers”) (Derrida, 1990: 240). As it is well known, Derrida’s activism 
crystallized in the foundation of the Groupe de recherches sur l’enseignement 
philosophique (Greph) and the Centre de recherches sur l’enseignement phi-
losophique (Creph), and led to the foundation in 1981 of the Collège interna-
tional de philosophie (Ciph).12 Derrida’s insistence on problematizing the 
so-called metaphorical use of the lexicon of reproduction could be seen as a 
contribution (and perhaps also as a deconstruction) of the ongoing concern of 
French left intellectuals in the wake of 1968 with the ideological role of schools 
and universities in the reproduction of social life in France and elsewhere.
2. Notice how, in this passage, Derrida begins to interrogate the concept of 
metaphor. Although he does not yet provide a full-fledged deconstruction of the 
metaphorics of life, said deconstruction is already hinted at by the fact that 
Derrida is primarily concerned with asking a how question, that is, with inter-
rogating the modes of metaphorical relation that enable reproduction to be 
used both in biology and in discussions about the life of teaching institutions, 
for instance, as well as their conditions of possibility. Derrida’s rhetorical ques-
tion as to whether the “metaphors” of reproduction and of life and death are 
just metaphors among other metaphors already points in the direction of his 
radical rethinking of the metaphoricity of life-death, which will take place later 
in the seminar through an engagement with Friedrich Nietzsche that crystal-
lizes in the following argument: “La métaphore ne transporte pas la selection 
d’un lieu à un autre, la métaphore est un effet de reproduction/sélection, elle 
est soumise elle-même à la loi génético-institutionnelle de la reproduction/
sélection.” (“Metaphor does not transport selection from a place to another, 
11. For a helpful discussion of this moment in the still recent history of French leftist thought, 
see the preface by Étienne Balibar and the introduction and editorial notes of Jacques Bidet 
to Louis Althusser (2011: 7-32).
12. The texts and contexts of Derrida’s engagement with the French state attempts to reform 
higher education in the wake of 1968 can be found in Derrida (1990). For a good overview 
of this aspect of Derrida’s work, see Orchard (2011).
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metaphor is an effect of reproduction/selection, it is itself submitted to the 
genetico-institutional law of reproduction/selection.”) (Derrida, 2019: 87). 
Reproduction does not become a metaphor when it is taken from the discur-
sive context of biology, of phenomenology, or of theology, for that matter, and 
applied to institutions; rather, metaphors themselves are structurally submitted 
to the rules of reproduction and selection, which, in turn, are not the proper 
attribute of biological systems alone. As a result, we cannot say that they are 
only analogically applied to non-biological systems on the basis of similitudes 
between these two systems, since the very identification of the markers of 
similitude that enable an analogy to be made are themselves the effect of oper-
ations of reproduction/selection. 
3. Notice how Derrida in this passage cuts through the usual line that dis-
tinguishes between life and death, entangling the two in an insoluble bond. 
Moreover, the insolubility of life and death affects all “metaphorical” deploy-
ments of the lexicon of reproduction and selection. As a result, the very things 
that are said to ensure the life of the institution, that is, to ensure the steady 
function of its reproduction through selection, are in fact also the conditions of 
its death. Derrida’s efforts to reopen the philosophy of life beyond its logocentric 
and metaphysical closures are largely an attempt to account rigorously for this 
irresolvable contamination, that is, to account for the fact that the very activities 
and mechanisms that ensure life’s reproduction carry the germs of its death.
2. Democratic Suicides: Autoimmunity in Voyous
Although Derrida does not yet rely on the language of autoimmunity in La 
vie la mort, it is possible to recognize in the passage examined above inklings 
of the main insight regarding democracy’s life-death that he articulates 
throughout Voyous. Indeed, this main insight could be recast by paraphrasing 
one of the questions that Derrida poses in the passage from La vie la mort that 
I quoted above: “How to explain that the re-production of democracy and 
democratic programs are at once conditions of democracy’s life and death?” 
In Voyous, Derrida pursues this question by making the case that there is 
something suicidal about democracy, and that these suicidal tendencies require 
that we rethink the life of democracy in terms of autoimmunity (Derrida 
2003: 57), therefore displacing any other biological or phenomenological con-
ceptions of life that would not grant as predominant a role to the complex 
dynamics of exposure, contagion, and immunitary interactions that produce 
anything like a living self. 
To pursue further Derrida’s call for another thinking of life that might track 
the complexity of democracy’s autoimmunitary living, I want to turn to a 
passage from the third session of Voyous where Derrida provides the first sus-
tained articulation of the logic of suicidal autoimmunity vis-à-vis democracy’s 
life-death:
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[D]e quelque côté qu’on l’examine, la suspension du processus électoral en 
Algérie serait un évènement typique de toutes les atteintes à la démocratie au 
nom de la démocratie. Le gouvernement algérien et une partie importante, 
quoique non majoritaire, du peuple algérien (voire de peuples étrangers à 
l’Algérie) ont considéré que le processus électoral engagé conduirait démocra-
tiquement à la fin de la démocratie. Ils ont donc préféré y mettre fin eux-
mêmes. Ils ont souverainement décidé de suspendre du moins provisoirement 
la démocratie pour son bien et pour en prendre soin, pour l’immuniser contre la 
pire et plus probable agression. […] La démocratie a toujours été suicidaire 
et s’il y a un à-venir pour elle, c’est à la condition de penser autrement la 
vie, et la force de vie. C’est pourquoi j’ai insisté tout à l’heure sur le fait que 
l’Acte pur est déterminé par Aristote comme une vie. (Derrida, 2003: 57, 
emphases mine)
From whichever angle you examine it, the suspension of the electoral process 
in Algeria would be a typical event of all the attacks on democracy in the name 
of democracy. The Algerian government and an important, though non-ma-
joritarian, part of the Algerian people (indeed of peoples foreign to Algeria) 
considered that the electoral process in course would lead democratically to the 
end of democracy. They thus preferred to put an end to it themselves. They 
have sovereignly decided to suspend democracy at least provisionally for its 
own good and to take care of it, to immunize it against the worst and most 
probable aggression. […] Democracy has always been suicidal and if there is 
a “to-come” for it, it is on the condition of thinking life otherwise, and the 
force of life. That is why I insisted just now on the fact that the pure act is 
determined by Aristotle as a life.
In the sentence that immediately follows this paragraph, Derrida mobiliz-
es the phrase “suicide auto-immunitaire” (“auto-immunitary suicide”) (Der-
rida, 2003: 57) to capture the type of suicide that is always a condition of 
democracy—be it “potentially.” The decision of the Algerian government to 
suspend the 1992 elections in order to prevent the arrival into power of an 
Islamist party typifies the autoimmune suicide to which any democracy, for 
Derrida, is irremediably exposed, since no democracy is absolutely immune 
to the chance of being attacked in its own name, of having to attack itself in 
order to defend itself (from itself ), or even of being forced by some (internal 
or external) actors to destroy its life in order to “save” its life. Indeed, the 
example of the Algerian elections as Derrida elaborates it could be considered 
a case not just of autoimmunity in general, but more precisely of what French 
immunologist Thomas Pradeu characterizes as an “autoimmune disease,” 
which he distinguishes from autoimmunity tout court by the fact that, in the 
case of autoimmune diseases, “an organism’s immune system triggers a destruc-
tive response against its own organs or tissues” (Pradeu, 2012: 88, emphases 
mine).13 The irreversible decision to suspend an election on the basis of a 
probabilistic calculus that suggests that the election results would endanger 
13. For an interesting take on Derrida’s thinking of autoimmunity in relation to Thomas 
Pradeu’s theorization of immunology, see Timár (2017).
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democracy through the election of an anti-democratic political party is not 
simply a case of the “non-pathological” functioning of democracy’s autoim-
munity (Pradeu, 2019: 17-18); it amounts to an act of self-destruction enact-
ed in the name of self-preservation, something closer to a pathological auto-
immune sacrifice, calculated in such a way that its immanent logic must decree 
self-destruction in order to achieve self-redemption. It is this sacrificability of 
democracy that prompts Derrida to insist that life—and, especially its force—
needs to be rethought, thought otherwise, in order to resist the irreducible 
possibility of a democratic autoimmunitary pathology that threatens the 
chance of any démocratie à venir.
Furthermore, notice that it is in this precise context that Derrida refers the 
reader back to his prior analyses of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda, where 
Aristotle famously argues for the necessary existence of the Prime Mover as 
the imperceptible, ungenerated, eternal, and unmoved being whose activity 
constitutes the efficient cause that is responsible for the cosmos’s motion. Now, 
if the relation between the autoimmune suicide of democracy that the suspen-
sion of the Algerian elections exemplifies and the necessity of rethinking the 
life of democracy otherwise is not that difficult to discern, the same cannot be 
said for the relationship between these two motifs and Derrida’s reading of the 
Prime Mover in the first chapter of Voyous. This tension intensifies as soon as 
we take stock of the fact that Derrida even relies on the language of ground-
ing—“C’est pourquoi” (“This is why”) (Derrida 2003: 57, emphasis mine)—
to characterize the relation between his call for another concept of life, the 
chance that democracy might have a “to-come,” and his insistence on the fact 
that, for Aristotle, the prime mover is a living being. For the remainder of this 
article, I want to explore precisely why Derrida makes this offhand reference 
to his previous engagement with Aristotle at this precise point in his argument. 
What might we learn if we follow Derrida’s own indications and read his 
admittedly brief engagement with Metaphysics Lambda as offering a clue as to 
the possible content of this other thinking of life?
3. Aristotle’s Prime Mover, Ipseity, and Another Concept of Life
To pursue this question, we would do well to begin by recalling that Derrida 
turns to Aristotle’s prime mover in the context of his discussion of Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s description of the American people as a sort of democratic god 
(Derrida, 2003: 34-35), citing the following passage from Tocqueville: “Le 
people règne sur le monde politique américain comme Dieu sur l’univers. Il 
est la cause et la fin de toutes choses; tout en sort et tout s’y absorbe” (“The 
people reign over the American political world as god over the universe. It is 
the cause and the end of all things; everything comes out of it and everything 
is absorbed in it.”) (Tocqueville, 1981: 120). Although he does not rely at this 
point on the language of autoimmunity, Derrida’s reference to Tocqueville is 
crucial since it allows him to reformulate, in a more onto-theological register, 
the self-contradictory and aporetic life of autoimmune democracy. For, accord-
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ing to Derrida, Tocqueville’s theological “metaphor” is not simply a metaphor 
but in fact amounts to a rearticulation of a conflict that is internal to demo-
cratic life, which has been split since its very beginnings by the fact that it is 
answerable to two mutually exclusive truths: on the one hand, democracy 
relies on the axiom of henological ipseity—“l’ipséité de l’Un, l’autos de l’auton-
omie” (“the ipseity of the One, the autos of autonomy”) (Derrida, 2003: 35)—
since no democratic regime worthy of the name has ever existed without posit-
ing the people, in singular terms, as the source of legitimate power. On the other 
hand, democracy wouldn’t be democratic without also being under the injunc-
tion of what Derrida calls “la vérité de l’autre” (“the truth of the other”) 
(Derrida, 2003: 35), which means that democracy is also the political regime 
most open to dissent, to minorities, and even to its enemies. 
It is in this context that Derrida then begins to think of the prime mover. 
I cite the passage in extenso: 
Car le Dieu démocratique dont parle Tocqueville, ce souverain cause de soi et 
fin pour soi, il ressemblerait aussi, et cette ressemblance n’a pas fini de nous pro-
voquer à penser, à l’Acte pur, à l’energeia du Premier Moteur (to proton kinoun) 
d’Aristote. Sans se mouvoir ni être mu, l’acte de cette énergie pure met tout en 
mouvement, un mouvement de retour à soi, un mouvement circulaire, précise 
Aristote, car le premier mouvement est toujours cyclique. Et ce qui l’aspire 
où l’inspire, c’est un désir. Dieu, l’acte pur du Premier Moteur, il est à la fois 
érogène et pensable. Il est, si on peut dire, désirable (eromenon), le premier 
désirable (to proton orekton) en tant que premier intelligible (to proton noēton) 
qui se pense lui-même, pensée de la pensée (ē noēsis noēseos noēsis). Ce premier 
principe, Aristote le définit aussi, et cela comptera pour nous, comme une vie 
(diagōgē – Alexandre dit dans le commentaire de ce passage zōē et zēn pour la 
vie et le vivre),14 un genre de vie, une conduite de la vie, comparable à ce que 
14. It is worth pausing here to make two observations—one philological, the other more 
philosophical—about Derrida’s interpolation of the commentary of Alexander of Aphro-
disias to the Metaphysics, and about his remark on Alexander’s usage of the terms zēn and 
zōē to talk about the life of the prime mover. First, it should be noted that Derrida himself 
does not provide any explicit reference to Alexander’s commentary, so it is difficult to 
ascertain what he’s exactly referring to here. The likeliest candidate is the text of Alexander’s 
commentary to the Metaphysics, edited in the late nineteenth century by Michael Hayduck 
for the collection Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. As a matter of fact, in the commen-
tary to Metaphysics Lambda 1072b14 reproduced in this edition—the Aristotelian passage 
in question reads: “diagōgē de estin oia ē aristē mikron kronon ēmin” (“And the course of its 
life is of such a kind as the best we have for a short time”) (Aristotle, 1999: 1072b14)—we 
find several references to the life of the prime mover described as “euzōia” and as zōiōn and 
zēn (Hayduck, ed., 1891, 696-98). That said, readers should keep in mind that the con-
sensus among classicists since the work of Jacob Freudenthal (1885) is that only the com-
mentaries to the first five books of the Metaphysics could be attributed to Alexander and 
the rest—including the commentary to Metaphysics Lambda—should be attributed to 
medieval Byzantine Neo-Platonist commentator, Michael of Ephesus (for a more recent 
account of the scholarly consensus on this matter, see Luna, 2001: 53-71). On the other 
hand, it is possible, though less likely, that Derrida could have consulted Ibn Rushd’s 
commentary to the Metaphysics Lambda, since Ibn Rushd is the last of the classic Aristo-
telian commentators who had access to a partial version of Alexander’s commentary via 
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nous pouvons vivre de meilleur pendant tel bref moment (mikron khronon) 
de notre vie. (Derrida, 2003: 35, emphases mine) 
For the democratic god of which Tocqueville speaks, this sovereign cause 
of itself and end for itself, would also resemble, and this resemblance has 
not ceased to provoke us to think, the pure act, the energeia of Aristotle’s 
Prime Mover (to proton kinoun). Without moving or being moved, the act 
of this pure energy sets everything in motion, a motion of return to itself, a 
circular motion, as Aristotle clarifies, for the first motion is always cyclical. 
And what it aspires to or what inspires it is a desire. God, the pure act of 
the prime mover, is at once erogenous and thinkable. It is, if one can say so, 
desirable (eromenon), the first desirable, (to proton orekton) insofar as the first 
intelligible (to proton noēton) which thinks itself, the thiking of thinking (ē 
noēsis noēseos noēsis). Aristotle also defines this first principle, and this matters 
to us, as a life (diagōgē—Alexander uses in the commentary of this passage 
Syriac translation that included up to Book 7 in Metaphysics Lambda, which is where the 
passage in question—i.e., 1072b—is located. Secondly, regardless of the philological sound-
ness of Derrida’s remark concerning Alexander’s commentary, of actual philosophical rele-
vance is the fact that Derrida turns to Alexander here in order to lay the foundations of a 
polemic with Agamben, which only takes place explicitly and briefly in the following 
section of Voyous (Derrida, 2003: 46). Contra Agamben’s thesis regarding the supposed 
distinction between bare life (zōē) and qualified life (bios) (Agamben, 1995: 3), the tradition 
of Aristotelian commentary leaves no doubt as to the fact that the prime mover is charac-
terized as a zōē, rather than bios. Now, Agamben himself is aware of this (Agamben, 1995: 
3); but he doesn’t seem to think that this moment in Aristotle and in the tradition of his 
commentators poses a challenge to his thesis regarding the existence of a conceptual dis-
tinction between bios and zōē in the Greek context. Although Derrida never developed this 
philological refutation into a full-fledged critique of Agamben’s biopolitical understanding 
of the history of Western ontology, it is possible to see why taking Derrida’s insistence on 
the prime mover as zōē to its utmost consequences would have devastating effects for 
Agamben’s entire philosophical project in Homo sacer. In arguing that the highest form of 
life—the ground and telos of both zōē and bios according to Agamben’s classification—is 
not just a species of zōē, but also determined in its essence by the ontological form of 
ipseity, Derrida is not simply upending the linguistico-conceptual bases of Agamben’s gene-
alogy of modern politics. He is also providing the foundations for a radical critique of 
Agamben’s attempt to theorize forma-di-vita or “form-of life” (see Agamben, 2014: 350-
351) as the only possibility of interrupting the operations of sovereign power. Symptomat-
ic of the limits of Agamben’s project is his choice of the following formula from Spinoza’s 
Ethics: “Acquiescentia in se ipso est laetitia orta ex eo, quod homo se ipsum suamque 
agenda potentiam contemplatur.” (“Satisfaction in oneself is a joy borne out of the fact that 
man contemplates itself as well as its own potency to act.”) (Spinoza, 2020: 328) to describe 
the mode of being of forma-di-vita (Agamben, 2014: 351). The fact that what Agamben 
calls forma-di-vita—that is, a life that consists in self-enjoyment, self-contemplation, and 
self-empowerment—could well be applied to the Aristotelian prime mover reveals the extent 
to which Agamben’s signature concept of a life beyond sovereign power remains determined 
from within by the value of ipseity; its self-acquiescence, therefore, must be seen as isomor-
phic to the very sovereignty that this form of life was meant to interrupt. On the concept 
of acquiescentia in Spinoza as a form of ipseity or self-relation, see Carlisle (2017). In 
forthcoming work, I provide a more sustained critical engagement with Agamben’s think-
ing of life from a perspective informed by Derrida’s insistence on the bond between life and 
sovereignty via ipseity.
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zōē and zēn for life and living), a genre of life, a conduct of life comparable 
to the best life that we might be able to live during a brief moment (mikron 
khronon) in our life. 
I emphasized the verb “think” in the sentence introducing this long passage 
because it is Derrida himself who insists on the role that thinking plays in his 
own gesture of bringing Aristotle’s god to bear on Tocqueville’s democratic 
god. This choice of verb is not fortuitous; in fact, Derrida’s characterization 
of the thoughtful nature of the relation between these two gods already per-
forms a powerful interpretation of Metaphysics Lambda. The Tocquevillean 
god of American democracy cannot stop making Derrida think of the Aristo-
telian god not simply because the former resembles the latter. It is true that 
both gods are causes of, and ends for, themselves, and it is also the case that it 
is through their respective en-actments of the form of henological ipseity that 
these two gods make everything else move and act in a manner that is analo-
gous to their own absolute form of self-relation and self-possession. That said, 
the analogies that would bind these two gods to each other as well as these 
gods to everything that falls under their jurisdiction are not simply the result 
of a formal analogy. On the contrary, the very fact that Derrida can’t stop 
thinking about the prime mover already attests to the fact that the resemblance 
between these two gods is itself grounded in, if not even an effect of, the 
activity of Aristotle’s god. In this respect, the very thought that thinks this 
resemblance—that is, Derrida’s own thinking process—has already been set 
in motion by this unmoved mover. 
Moreover, as the pure activity of thought thinking itself, i.e., ipseity as 
ex-carnated intelligibility and motion-less agency, Aristotle’s prime mover not 
only moves Derrida to think of it as the onto-epistemic model that re-pro-
duces itself in the latent theological figures that inform the concept of sov-
ereignty in modern, i.e., secular democratic regimes. For this model also 
determines and guides teleologically the images of the democratic good life, 
and many conceptions of the force of the living even within biology, perhaps 
best exemplified in recent theories of biological autopoiesis.15 This is why 
Derrida emphasizes that the prime mover is not just a concept or a Platonic 
form, but a form of life. And not just any form of life, but ipseity as the form 
that informs the highest form of life—a perfected life that can only be under-
stood philosophically in terms of the constant power to position itself as 
15. By autopoiesis, I am referring to the influential theorization of the structure of living systems 
in terms of auto-poiesis, as formulated by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. It is 
telling that, in spite of their own relationship to cybernetics, semiotics, systems theory, and 
other recent developments in epistemology and ontology, Maturana and Varela remain 
incapable of problematizing, within the axiomatics of their discourse about the essence of 
living systems, their own reliance on the position of the autos and, above all, on the repro-
duction of this self-same position, as the very ground and form of biological identity. See 
Maturana and Varela (1994: 45-47).
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self-same, and, from this position, rule all living beings by forcing them, via 
inspiration, to aspire to imitate as best as they can the ipseitocratic life of the 
prime mover, which thus stands as the arkhē and telos of cosmic intelligibil-
ity, activity, and feeling.
We are now in a better position to understand why Derrida evokes his 
earlier engagement with Aristotle’s prime mover when, two chapters later, 
he is analyzing the autoimmune suicidal tendencies of democracy through 
the example of the suspension of the Algerian elections in 1992. The fact that 
Derrida emphasizes that democracy in Algeria was suspended pour son 
bien (Derrida, 2003: 57) (“for its own sake,” or, more literally, “for its own 
good”) reveals the extent to which the life of democracy remains informed 
onto-epistemically by a teleological structure for which the prime mover provides 
a powerful formal articulation and historical precedent. In the name of its good, 
that is, in the name of becoming itself properly, of truly achieving ipseity, democ-
racy can always be killed, that is, sacrificed in a quasi-suicidal manner so that it 
can preserve its own self-hood, its own vital identity. Hence Derrida’s acknowl-
edgement that a conception of life radically different than that which informs 
contemporary discussions about democracy’s impending death is required if we 
are both to grapple with democracy’s actual suicidal tendencies and militate for 
its survival (Derrida, 2003: 24). Derrida’s rearticulation of democracy’s life-death 
in terms of autoimmunity exposes the metaphysical bases and the ideological 
nature of any such calculation, and of any such sacrifice of democracy. But, 
more crucially still, autoimmunity, as Derrida elaborates it, promises to displa-
ce the im-position of ipseity or the thesis of the absolute onto-epistemic prima-
cy of the self itself, from the privileged place that it continues to enjoy within the 
open field of the living, across any and all disciplinary or discursive formations. 
Sub specie autoimmunitatis, the force of the living appears not in the form of a 
circular process in and through which the living entity is both produced in the 
autonomy of its living and reproduces itself—any such autos is not the ground, 
but an effect of processes of self-relation that are not entirely ruled by the telos of 
an immune ipseity, of a self absolutely ensured of the imperviousness of the 
membrane that separates it from any other. 
Remarks about the fragility of democracy in political or philosophical dis-
cussions are a cliché, but Derrida’s work on the autoimmune life-death of 
democracy stands out from current discussions about democracy’s precarious 
life precisely because of the way in which he relentlessly pursuits this insight 
to its ultimate conclusion, leading us to an aporia that most intellectuals who 
defend liberal democracy today are seldom equipped to think through, let 
alone respond to theoretically or politically. This aporia could be expressed in 
the following way: the autoimmunity of democracy or the contamination of 
life and death that marks democratic existence is not an accident due to the 
faulty implementation of the idea of democracy in reality—it is a structural 
feature of democracy. This feature is so intrinsic that it renders any belief in 
an ultimate normative criterion that would distinguish between a democracy 
that is alive, dying, or dead counterproductive to any militancy in favor of 
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democracy’s to-come. A democracy that would have been purged of its auto-
immune suicidability would cease to be a democracy. Any mode of attending 
to democracy’s autoimmune suicidal tendencies without trying to eliminate 
these tendencies must unfold under a rather minimal injunction, namely, to 
remain vigilant about any attempt to foreclose democracy’s in-finite trans-
formability. Rather than adopt as criteria for the vitality of a democracy a 
notion of life that is explicitly or implicitly informed by the phantasm of an 
impervious, totally immune life, it is life itself which needs to be thought 
otherwise on the basis of the necessity of affirming democracy’s autoimmunity 
for the sake of its survival—and ours. 
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